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ASSOCIATION, a Utah Corporation, 
BRUCE MANKA and FRANK 
GUYMAN 
Defendants/Appellants. 
Court of Appeals No. 20090166 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
The appellee does not dispute this court's jurisdiction. 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The only issue for this interlocutory appeal is whether Judge Faust abused his 
discretion in granting appellee's motion to set aside its default judgment on the basis of 
the pleadings and the file indicating that Plaintiffs counsel mistakenly calendared the 
trial for the originally set trial date of November 14, 2008, rather than the changed trial 
date of October 28,2008, and therefore missed the rescheduled trial date. 
1 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL OR 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The sole issue in this case is determined by Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) 
and the well established common law interpretations of this Rule that default 
judgments should be liberally granted upon a reasonable justification if the motion to 
set aside the default judgment is filed within the three month period of the judgment 
and a reasonable ground is established within the discretion of the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Plaintiff/appellee filed this collection action to recover for services 
rendered for plumbing services provided the defendant/appellant. (R.l-11). 
Defendants have argued that they did not have a contract with Plaintiff for the services 
rendered. 
B. Course of Proceedings Below 
Defendant's unsuccessful motions to dismiss and multiple discovery delays have 
continued this trial for more than three years. At the pretrial conference on July 22, 
2008 (R.325-26), attended by both parties, a trial date was scheduled for November 14, 
2008 at 9:30 a.m. (R. 333-335). This is the trial date Plaintiffs counsel mistakenly 
relied upon as the correct trial date even though the court apparently moved the trial 
date earlier twice. Specifically, on July 25, 2008, the trial court's minute entry 
2 
indicates the trial date was expedited one month to October 14, 2008. (R. 337-39). On 
July 29, 2008, the trial date was again changed to October 28, 2008 (340-41). In 
preparation for the impending trial, Plaintiffs counsel submitted both his witness and 
exhibit lists as required by the court at the pretrial conference. Everything in the 
record indicated that the plaintiff was ready and willing to try the case on the 
anticipated trial date. Plaintiffs counsel mistakenly kept the November 14, 2008 on 
his calendar as the assigned trial date and, as a consequence, did not appear at the 
rescheduled trial date of October 28, 2008. On October 28, 2008 when Plaintiffs did 
not appear at the rescheduled trial date, defense counsel did not make a professional 
courtesy phone call to see if a mistake in scheduling had been made in a case counsel 
had been working on for more than three years, but instead immediately accepted a 
default judgment. 
When plaintiffs counsel was notified of the entry of the default judgment he 
immediately filed a motion to set aside the default judgment on the basis of his mistake 
in relying on the November 14 originally set trial date. In response, Judge Faust's 
granted Plaintiffs Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment on February 4, 2009. 
The Minute Entry reads: "After review of the file and pleadings therein, the court rules 
that the default of any party previously entered is hereby set aside." (Minute Entry of 
February 4, 2009: R. 400, Addendum, Exhibit "G"). 
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The Defendant/appellant filed this interlocutory appeal in response to Judge 
Faust's order setting aside the default judgment. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. The plaintiff filed this collection action January 19, 2005 for 
Plumbing services rendered to the defendant's condominium development. (R.l-11). 
2. The defendant has denied any responsibility under the service 
contract. (R.42-52). 
3. Following the pretrial conference, on July 22, 2008 the court sent to the parties 
notice that the Bench Trial was set for November 14, 2008 at 9:30 a.m. (R. 333-335). 
Plaintiffs counsel relied upon this notice and scheduled the trial on his calendar for 
November 14, 2008. 
4. The court's minute entry later shows that this trial date was 
rescheduled to October 14, 2008, then changed again to October 28, 2008. (R. 333-39). 
5. Both parties timely filed their witness and exhibit designations in preparation for 
trial as ordered by the trial court at the pretrial hearing on July 22, 2008 in preparation 
for trial (R. 350-55, 356-65). 
6. On October 28, 2008 defense counsel appeared for the rescheduled trial date, 
and when plaintiffs counsel failed to appear a default was granted, without a courtesy 
phone call to see if a mistake had been made on scheduling. 
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7. Immediately upon learning about that he had made a mistake in scheduling the 
trial date, plaintiff on November 3, 2008 filed a motion to set aside the default 
judgment on the basis of counsel's mistaken belief that the trial had been set for 
November 14, 2008 (the original trial date), rather then the October 28, 2008 
(rescheduled trial date). The plaintiff explained in support of the motion to set aside 
the following mistake he had made: 
The plaintiff believed that the trial date was November 14, 2008, and has 
prepared for that date. It appears that the trial date was originally set for 
November 14, 2008, and then changed to October 14, 2008, and then changed 
again to October 28, 2008. The Plaintiff believed the trial was set for November 
14, 2008. The Plaintiff did not receive a phone call or any kind of notice on 
October 28, 2008, that the trial was proceeding and the Defendant's attorney 
knew the Plaintiff was ready for trial as exhibits and witness lists had been 
mailed only weeks earlier. 
The Plaintiff believes that the changes in setting of the trial dates caused 
the confusion and is the reason the Plaintiff did not appear on October 28, 2008. 




(R. 372-73, Addendum, Exhibit "D"). 
8. On February 4, 2009, Judge Faust signed a Minute Entry granting 
plaintiff/appellee's Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment, explaining as a basis the 
following: "After review of the file and pleadings therein, the court rules that the 
default of any party previously entered is hereby set Aside." (Minute Entry of February 
4, 2009: R. 400, Addendum, Exhibit "G"). 
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9. Defendants/appellant filed their Petition seeking permission to 
Appeal from Judge Faust's February 4, 2009 Order setting aside the default judgment. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Judge Faust's granting of plaintiff s Motion to Set Aside the Default 
Judgment did not constitute an abuse of discretion, but to the contrary, is consistent 
with the Utah Supreme Court's directive in Menzies v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81, 150 P.3d 
480, 502, supported by other Utah well established authority that trial courts should 
(1) liberally apply Rule 60(b), by granting a motion to set aside a default judgment for 
a mistake; (2) enable the case to be decided on the merits; (3) respect the duty to be 
"generally indulgent toward vacating default judgments;" (4) follow the judicial 
directive to "incline towards granting relief in a doubtful case to the end that the party 
may have a hearing;" and (5) adhere to the duty not "to refuse to vacate a default 
judgment where there is a reasonable justification or excuse for the ... failure and 
timely application is made to set it aside." Thus Judge Faust's setting aside the default 
judgment is not only well within his discretion, it furthers all the policies underlying 
60(b) which favor a trial on the merits over the granting of a technical default based 
upon a mistake in calendaring. 
Lastly, the defendants/appellants have not established any facts supportive of 




STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The well established standard of review for reviewing default judgments is an 
abuse of discretion standard. The Utah Supreme Court in Menzies v. Galetka, 2006 
UT 81, 150 P.3d 480, explained the standard of review for Rule 60(b) motions to set 
aside a judgment as follows: 
A district court has broad discretion to rule on a motion to set aside a default 
judgment under rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See Lund v. 
Brown, 2000 UT 75, 11 P.3d 277; Russell v. Martell, 681 P.2d 1193, 1194 (Utah 
1984); State Dep't of Soc. Servs. V. Musselman, 667 P.2d 1053, 1055 (Utah 
1983. Thus we review a district court's denial of a 60(b) motion under an abuse 
of discretion standard of review. (Id. at 502). 
The trial judge granted Plaintiffs Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment on the 
basis of plaintiff s mistaken understanding of the trial date due to the changes the 
occurred that he did not calendar. This finding is within the trial court's discretion and 
should not be set aside as an abuse of discretion. 
POINT II. 
PLAINTIFF'S 60(b) MOTION WAS TIMELY FILED 
A motion under Rule 60(b) must "be made within a reasonable time ... not more 
than 3 months after the judgment ... was entered." Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b). The 
default judgment was entered on October 28, 2008. The Plaintiff on November 3, 
2008 filed MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT AND SET NEW TRIAL DATE (R. 
7 
372-73, Addendum, Exhibit "D")(Exhibit attached to Defendant's Appellant Brief). 
Clearly, Plaintiff filed the Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment within the 
requisite three month specified by Rule 60(b). 
POINT III. 
JUDGE FAUST'S RULING SETTING ASIDE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
FITS THE PLAIN MEANING OF UTAH R. CIV. P. 60(b)(1) 
Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1) permits relief from a judgment if, among other things, 
a claimant can demonstrate "mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect." 
This case has been pending for three and a half years and has gone through several 
stages of wrangling in preparation for trial. In Plaintiffs Motion to Set Aside the 
Default Judgment filed November 3, 2008 plaintiff explained and alleged the mistaken 
belief in the trial date as the reason for his absence on the trial date as explained above. 
(R. 372-73, Addendum, Exhibit "D"). 
The factual reasons given in plaintiffs motion are corroborated by the court 
judicially noticing the minute entries and pleadings in the file. A pretrial conference 
was held on July 22, 2008, during which Dennis Mangrum appeared on behalf of the 
Plaintiff. (Minute Entry dated July 7, 2008)(R. 333-335). At the pretrial conference, a 
trial date was set for November 14, 2008. (R. 333-335). (Page 8 of Minute Entries)(R. 
333-335). The court's Minute Entries indicate that on July 25, 2008 the trial date was 
moved up one month to October 14, 2008. (R. 337-39). On July 25, 2008 the trial date 
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was again changed for the third time to October 28, 2008. (R. 340-41). The court's 
Minute Entry of October 1, 2008 indicates that on October 2, 2008 the Plaintiff filed a 
witness and exhibit list for the upcoming trial, demonstrating preparedness for trial. (R. 
350-55, 356-65). 
In Plaintiffs Motion to Set Aside Plaintiffs counsel alleged that he made a 
mistake in the calendaring of the trial date, in that he relied on the initial trial date set 
at the pretrial conference. (R. 372-373). He further alleged that he was prepared to go 
to trial at any date the trial court may have reassigned for the trial. Judge Faust at the 
hearing to Set Aside the Default Judgment obviously credited the Plaintiffs mistake. 
(R.372-373). Consequently, on February 4, 2009 he granted Plaintiffs Motion to Set 
Aside the Default Judgment on the basis if the calendaring mistake alleged by 
Plaintiffs counsel. (R. 400-401). The calendaring mistake alleged by Plaintiff has 
been acknowledged by the defendant as the basis argued before Judge Faust in the 
hearing of the Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment and provides the factual basis 
for the court exercising his discretion. 
Judge Faust's granted Plaintiffs Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment on 
February 4, 2009 (Minute Entry of February 4, 2009)(R. 400-401). The Minute Entry 
reads: "After review of the file and pleadings therein, the court rules that the default of 
any party previously entered is hereby set aside." (Minute Entry of February 4, 2009: 
R. 400, Addendum, Exhibit "G"). 
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This exercise of his discretion as a trial judge reviewing a Rule 60(b) motion is 
well established in the law of Utah. The Supreme Court in Lund v. Brown, 2000 UT 
75, 11 P.3d 277, reversed and remanded a default judgment for a mistake in the law as 
to the consequence of bankruptcy filings. The court explained that "this court has 
stated that 'it is quite uniformly regarded as an abuse of discretion to refuse to vacate a 
default judgment where there is reasonable justification or excuse for the defendant's 
failure to appear.' Helgesen v. Inyangumai, 636 P.2d 1079, 1081 (quoting Mayhew v. 
Standard Gilsonite Co., 14 Utah 2d 52, 54, 376 P.2d 951, 952 (1962))." 
In Helgesen v. Inyangumai, 636 P.2d 1079, 1081 (Utah 1981) the Utah Supreme Court 
reversed and remanded a default judgment when the trial court abused its discretion 
when he granted a default judgment despite reasons to believe the opponent had 
intended to dispute the claim. The court noted that an insurance adjuster had been in 
contact with plaintiffs counsel prior to filing the default. When the time for filing 
arose and no answer had been filed, rather than making a courtesy of a phone call or a 
warning the plaintiff that a default judgment would be pursued unless the plaintiff 
responded, the defendant obtained an immediate default judgment. Reversing the 
default judgment on appeal, the court expressed the opinion: 
Under the circumstances the adjuster had every reason to believe that he would 
be extended professional courtesy by the attorney with whom he was dealing 
and would hear back from him .... He was reasonable in believing that no 
default judgment would be taken in the meantime." (636 P.2d at 1081-82). 
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Under the facts of this case, after litigation for more than three years, a pretrial 
conference attended by both counsel, the subsequent submission of witness and exhibit 
lists by both parties, opposing counsel could have extended a professional courtesy of 
phoning plaintiffs counsel to see if a mistake in scheduling or other exigent 
circumstance had arisen before immediately seeking a default judgment. None of the 
behavior of either counsel suggested that either was not ready to try the case. Justice 
certainly would have been furthered by a professional courtesy phone call to see if a 
mistake had been made. 
It is well within the discretion of the trial judge to credit the allegations made in 
support of the Motion to Set Aside a Default Judgment. Indeed, as explained above, 
the trial court is afforded broad discretion in ruling on a motion for relief from 
judgment under Rule 60(b), and its decision will not be disturbed absent an abuse of 
discretion. Menzies v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81, 150 P.3d 480, 502. Rule 60(b) 
specifically affords the trial court discretion in determining whether a party seeking 
equitable relief has shown "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect." 
Judge Faust made such a finding in setting aside the Default Judgment and such ruling 
should be affirmed. 
POINT IV. 
JUDGE FAUST'S RULING FITS THE ANNOUNCED EQUITABLE 
PRINCIPLES OF 60(b)(1), THAT MOTIONS TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT 
JUDGMENTS SHOULD BE LIBERALLY GRANTED 
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The Utah Supreme Court has frequently reversed and remanded under the abuse 
of discretion standard when the trial court has refused to set aside a default judgment 
when a coherent explanation for the default has been offered by counsel. For example, 
the Utah Supreme Court in Menzies v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81, 150 P.3d 480, reversing 
and remanding for the court's failure to grant a Rule 60(b) motion to set aside a 
judgment, rehearsed the well established rule that Rule 60(b) Motions to Set Aside 
Default Judgments should be liberally granted to the end that cases may be decided on 
the merits, rather than on technicalities: 
[i]t is well established that 60(b) motions should be liberally granted because of 
the equitable nature of the rule. Therefore, a district court should exercise its 
discretion in favor of granting relief so that controversies can be decided on the 
merits rather than on technicalities. See, Id. Mussleman, 667 P.2d at 1055-56. 
Accordingly, it is an abuse of discretion for a district court to deny a 60(b) 
motion to set aside a default judgment if there is a reasonable justification for 
the moving party's failure and the party requested 60(b) relief in a timely 
fashion. (Id. at 150 P.3d at 502). 
The court added the following justification for liberally granting 
motions to set aside default judgments: 
Because of the equitable nature of the rule, a district court has broad discretion 
to rule on a 60(b) motion. Lund, 2000 UT 75, 11 P.3d 277. However, this 
discretion is tempered by the fact that the rule is designed to be remedial and 
must be liberally applied. Id. See also, Cmty. Dental Servs. V. Tani, 282 F.3d 
1164, 1169-70 (9th Cir. 2002)(discussing rule 60(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure). "[JJudgment by default is an extreme measure and a case 
should, whenever possible, be decided on the merits." Tani, 282 F.3d at 1170 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also State Dept. ofSoc. 
Servs v. Mussleman, 667 P.2d 1053, 1055 (Utah 1983)(same). Accordingly, a 
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district court "should be generally indulgent toward" vacating default 
judgments, Katz, 732 P.2d 93, and must "incline towards granting relief in a 
doubtful case to the end that the party may have a hearing." Lund, 2000 UT 75, 
11 P.3d 277(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus "it is quite 
uniformly regarded as an abuse of discretion to refuse to vacate a default 
judgment where there is a reasonable justification or excuse for the ... failure ... 
and timely application is made to set it aside." (Id. (citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
Similarly, in Mayhew v. Standard Gilsonite Co., 14 Utah 2d 52, 376 P.2d 951 
(1962) the Utah Supreme Court reversed and remanded a default judgment. In doing 
so the court review the liberal attitude the trial courts should consider when ruling on 
timely filed motions to set aside a default judgment: 
It is undoubtedly correct that the trial court is endowed with considerable 
latitude of discretion in granting or denying such motions. However, it is also 
true that the court cannot act arbitrarily in that regard, but should be generally 
indulgent toward permitting full inquiry and knowledge of disputes so they can 
be settled advisedly and inconformity with law and justice. To clamp a 
judgment rigidly and irrevocably on a party without a hearing is obviously harsh 
and oppressive thing. It is fundamental in our system of justice that each party 
to a controversy should be afforded an opportunity to present his side of the 
case. For that reason it is quite uniformly regarded as an abuse of discretion to 
refuse to vacate a default judgment where there is reasonable justification or 
excuse for the defendant's failure to appear and timely application is made to set 
it aside. (14 Utah 2d at 53-54). 
Also, the court in Olsen v. Cummings, 565 P.2d 1123 (Utah 1977), in 
Reversing and remanding for failure to set aside a default judgment, quoted the above 
standard announced in Mayhew, and added: "Because an application to set aside a 
default is equitable in nature and is addressed to the conscience of the court, all the 
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attendant circumstances should be considered. Relief in doubtful cases generally will 
be granted so a party may have a hearing." (Citations omitted). 
Under the facts of the case, the trial court's granting Plaintiffs Motion 
to Set Aside the Default Judgment is consistent with the Utah Supreme Court's 
directive in Menzies supported by other Utah cases that trial courts should (1) liberally 
apply Rule 60(b), by granting a motion to set aside a default judgment for a mistake; 
(2) enable the case to be decided on the merits; (3) respect the duty to be "generally 
indulgent toward vacating default judgments;" (4) follow the judicial directive to 
"incline towards granting relief in a doubtful case to the end that the party may have a 
hearing;" and (5) adhere to the duty not "to refuse to vacate a default judgment where 
there is a reasonable justification or excuse for the ... failure and timely application is 
made to set it aside." Judge Faust's setting aside the default judgment is not only well 
within his discretion, it furthers all the policies underlying 60(b) which favor a trial on 
the merits to a technical default based upon a mistake in calendaring. 
POINT V. 
JUDGE FAUST'S RULING IS SUPPORTED BY THE PLEADINGS AND FILE 
AS REFERENCED IN HIS ORDER GRANTING THE MOTION TO SET 
ASIDE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
Judge Faust's order granting Plaintiffs Motion to Set Aside the Default 
Judgment on February 4, 2009 (Minute Entry of February 4, 2009) was based upon the 
file and the pleadings as recorded in his minute entry: "After review of the file and 
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pleadings therein, the court rules that the default of any party previously entered is 
hereby set aside." (Minute Entry of February 4, 2009: R. 400, Addendum, Exhibit 
"G"). 
It is well established that a trial court may take judicial notice of the pleadings 
and file. Richie v. Richie, 784 P.2d 465 (Utah 1989); In re S.H., 576 P.2d 1280 (Utah 
1978). The appellant has made a number of unsupported factual accusations related to 
whether plaintiffs mistake in scheduling the trial for the original trial date of 
November 14, 2008 constituted "excusable neglect." However, none of appellant's 
factual allegations suggesting that the plaintiff/appellee's mistake does not qualify for 
excusable neglect are either supported by an affidavit by appellant, or are the relevant 
to the fact of mistake. They are all unsupported factual claims contained only in a 
memorandum filed in opposition to the motion to set aside, not by sworn affidavit. 
The factual issue of mistake in calendaring, therefore, was both presented by 
plaintiff/appellee's motion and responded to by appellant's memorandum, rather than 
either formal testimony or affidavit testimony on either side. Appellant has conceded 
that the justification for failing to appear at the October 28, 2008 rescheduled trial date 
was a mistake and confusion in calendaring based upon three different trial dates 
assigned for the trial, but has only suggested that the mistake does not amount to 
excusable neglect. These conflicting trial dates are all a matter of record in the court's 
own minute entries which the court took judicial notice of when it granted the motion 
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to set aside based upon the pleadings and file. They are supportive of the claim of 
mistake which plaintiff/appellee alleged in his Motion to Set Aside the Default 
Judgment and are competent evidence to base the court's ruling crediting the reliability 
of the claim of mistake alleged and supported by the motion and contested by the 
appellant. 
POINT VI. 
DEFENDANT'S CLAIM FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES 
SHOULD BE DENIED 
Defendant makes the contradictory argument that it had not entered into a 
contract with the plaintiff, but that it is entitled to attorney fees pursuant to plaintiffs 
claim that a contract between the parties existed between the parties which provided 
for attorney fees. If the Default Judgment is not set aside, there has been no factual 
finding that a contract existed between the parties (a contested fact) that may justify an 
award of attorney fees on behalf of either party. 
In Bilanzich v. Lonetti, 2007 UT 26, 160 P.3d 1041, one of the cases cited by 
Appellant in support of a claim of attorney fees, the court acknowledged: "Generally, 
attorney fees are awarded only when authorized by contract or by statute. Fericks v. 
Lucy Ann Soffe Trust, 2004 UT 85, 100 P.3d 1200." See also, Pugh v. North Am. 
Warranty Servs., Inc., 2000 UT App 121, 1 P.3d 570, 574, citing Turtle Management, 
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Inc. V. Haggis Management, Inc., 645 P.2d 667, 671 (Utah 1982); Collier v. Heinz, 
827 P.2d 982, 983 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
Utah Code Ann. 78B-5-826 requires as a prerequisite to granting attorney fees 
on the basis of a contractual claim that the prevailing party establish at least one party 
is entitled to attorney fees by contract. If the Order Setting Aside the Default 
Judgment is reversed, then no court will have made a factual finding either that the 
contract and the attorney fees associated with the contract were in force between the 
parties and applies (Plaintiffs theory); or the contract is not binding on the Defendant 
because he was not a party to the contract (Defendant's theory). Without a factual 
finding relative to the whether the contract applies to the parties, no claim can be made 
under the reciprocal attorney fees contained within 78B-5-826 that appellant is entitled 
to attorney fess predicated on contract. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the showing of appellee's mistake in calendaring recognized by 
Judge Faust as an adequate basis for setting aside the default judgment, and the 
exercise of Judge Faust's discretion in crediting the allegation of mistake that is 
supported by the court's minute entry records of the conflicting dates, together with 
plaintiffs apparent trial readiness based upon an appearance at the pretrial conference 
as well as the subsequent production of witness and exhibit lists filed after the pretrial 
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conference in preparation for the trial, the trial court's granting of Plaintiff s Motion to 
Set Aside the Default Judgment should be affirmed. 
Dated this /£_ day of June, 2009 
Dennis L. Mangrum 
Attorney for Appellefej 
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